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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ein vereinfachtes Modell der Predisasse~hly-Phase für unkontrollier-
bare überleistungstransienten in LMFBR wird erläutert. Das Modell
berücksichtigt die Wechselwirkung zwischen geschmolzenem Brennstoff
und Kühlmittel im Kühlkanal und die daraus resultierende Brennstoff-
bewegung und Na-Ausstoßung. SNR-300 wird analysiert und die Ergeb-
nisse werden mit den Ergebnissen der SAS-VENUS-Rechnungen verglichen,
in welchen Brennstoffbewegungen nicht berücksichtigt werden. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, daß das Ausmaß des Transienten, soweit er von
der integrierten thermischen Energie, der Temperatur und des ge-
schmolzenen Brennstoffs abhängt, wesentlich reduziert werden kann,
wenn die ßrennstoffbewegung berücksichtigt wird.
ABSTRACT
A simplified model of the predisassembly phase for unprotected
overpower transients in LMFBR's is presented. The model includes
fuel movement and sodium expulsion as a result of the molten fuel-
coolant thermal interaction in the channels. The SNR-300, a proto-
type/demonstration plant is analysed and the results compared to
an earlierset of calculations using the SAS-VENUS computational
models. The previous analysis neglects fuel movement. The results
indicate that substantial reductions in the severity of the transient,
as measured by molten fuel produced, the thermal energy generated,
and the final temperatures, can be obtained when fuel movement is
included.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Oespite the multitude of redundant and diverse trips desiqned
to ensure the safe and reliable operation of SNR 300, the analysis
of hypothetical accidents is still important in the desi9n of the
pressure vessel, containment and in licencing /1/. The unprotected
overpower transient ie; addition of positive reactivity accompanied
by a failure of the primary and secondary shut down systems, requires
further investigation because at present, it yields the highest work-
energy available to damage the reactor structures. The analysis
performed to date has been overly pessimistic because the reactivity
feedback due to fuel movement, following the molten U0 2-Na interaction
in the predisassembly phase, has been neglected /1/.
Mills and Kastenberg /2/ and Lorenzini and Flanagan /3/ were
first to show that fuel motion during this phase of an accident could
lead to shut down of the reactor, even before gross disassembly
accompanied by high pressures, high energy and high temperatures, can
take place. The importance of this potential for lowering the work-
energy has stimulated further research as reported at the recent meeting
on safety at Karlsruhe /4,6,7/.
The object of this report is to:
1) analyse the SNR-30o design using a simple model, which includes fuel
feedback, developed at UCLA /4,5/,
2) compare these new results with those obtained for SNR-30o using the
SAS-VENUS code modules at Argonne (which do not include fuel movement)
/1,6/ and
3) discuss those areas in this simple model which require improvement
and modification, so that a more realistic picture of the physics
and hence the work-energy can be obtained.
These objectives serve as justif;cation and underscore the importance,
of future work in this area.
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One point that should be made here (and again in the conclusions)
is that without fuel movement, the conservative approach is generally
the one that gives the hiqhest pressures and subsequently the hiqhest
positive ramps due to sodium expulsion during the transition to dis-
assemblyo With fuel movement, this is not always the case since faster
sodium expulsion also means faster fuel movement. Since the problem
is nonlinear,and depends on a variety of parameters (fuel particle
size, drag coefficients, failure thresholds etc) it is not always clear
that the most pessimistic assumptions without fuel movement are those
when fuel movement is included. This point will be discussed aqain.
11. PHYSICAL MODEL
The unprotected over power transient is assumed to be initiated
by a reactivity ramp of several to a few tens of dollars per second.
The primary and secondary shut down systems are assumed to fail and
the power increases, accompanied by a steep increase in fuel temperature.
This occurs in 100 to 300 milliseconds. The doppler feedback, qenerated
by the fuel temperature increase, keeps the reactivity below prompt
critical. At this point the central portion of the fuel pins in the inner
regions of the core begin to melt with subsequent failure of the fuel
pins due to fuel vapor pressure (as in the case of new pins) or retained
fission gas pressure (as in the case of hiqhly irradiated pins). This
pressure also drives the molten fuel into the coolant channel and a fuel-
coolant interaction ensues. There is an immediate rise in the ramp
insertion of reactivity caused by a reverse doppler effect due to fuel
chilling and by the rise of pressure causing sodium ejection.
The reactor may then go slightly super prompt critical causinq more
melting of the core with failure of fuel and subsequent thermal inter-
actionso After several milliseconds however, the fuel in the channels
where failure has occurred will also be ejected due to draq forces on
the particleso This results in a sharp decrease in the ramp rate. If
enough fuel is moved, the ramp becomes negative, resulting ultimately in
termination or shut down of the transient.
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The computer module employed in this study contains a neutronics
and a hydrodynamics model. For this study, the point kinetics model
with six groups of delayed neutrons, based on the forward march
technique of Hanson was used for the neutronics /8/. The core is
divided into Maxial and Kradial regions and the doppler feedback
is calculated by
69
Doppler
= - a
(1)
where a is the overall doppler coefficient for the reactor, am,k is the
volume weighted doppler worth of region m,k, Tm,k is the temperature
of region m,k and T~,k is the initial temperature of region m,k. The
coolant temperature is considered constant until the fuel-coolant inter-
action takes place and the transient is assumed adiabatic. Hence Tm,k (t)
is obt.ined from 0 ~o p
Tm , k (t) = T~, k +-r m, k J (t ') dt ' (2 )
where P (t) is the power at time t'~m,k is the volume weighted power
shape and the superscript (0) refers to the initial temperature. Each
region is characterized by an average fuel temperature and failure is
initiated when this average temperature reaches a certain threshold.
Independent calculations /9/ show that when 50% of the areal midplane
is molten, the average temperature of the midplane is between 29000 K and
32000K while the average temperature of only the molten part is between
30400 Kand 33000 Kdepending on the pin characteristics. Since the
mechanisms for failure are not well understood, an amount between 40 and
60 percent is generally used as the criterion for failure /1,5,6/ and
is varied to test for sensitivity. For the model used here, only a threshold
temperature can be specified and is varied between 30410K and 32410K.
In addition it is assumed that the failure only occurs in the center node
(at the axial midplane) where the power is highest.
After pin failure, the thermal interaction is modeled as follows.
The fuel-coolant mixture is characterized by TMix' the mixture temperature
computed from:
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(3)
where
To = initial sodium temperature
Tf = final sodium temperature assuminq instantaneous mixinq
and a constant volume process
j\ = input parameter dependin9 on particle size
The input parameterj\ allows one to match various heat transfer models
/3,4,5/ and various particle sizes /3/. This increase in temperature in
the interactinq volume results in pressure generation 9iven by the sodium
equations of state. Inside the two-phase region the pressure is calculated
by
log P = a - b - c + dT - eloge T
e T T
2
(4)
and outside the vapor dome by the Himpan
~ + a ] (v-d) = RTL (v-b)(Tv-c)
equation of state
(5)
The constants are 9iven in the Appendix.
Under the influence of this pressure, the interacting volume is assumed
to expand symmetrically about the axial midplane. The sodium displacement
is determined by
(6)
where m is the mass of the sodium column above the interactinq zone and
Vc(t) i5 the velocity. The forces are the pressure and gravity.
The interfacial movement is then determined from the velocity. It is also
assumed that the initial sodium velocity is zero and that only the fuel
in the axial midplane node interacts. This is consistant with the
symmetry picture.
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The drag force on the fuel particles is qiven by:
(7)
where:
0p = particle diameter
s = sodium density
Vp = particle velocity
Vc = sodium velocity
Co = drag coefficient.
The draq coefficient is chosen to be 0.44 /3/. The displacement, as in
the case of sodium, ;s calculated from an integration of Equation (6).
The feedback due to fuel and sodium movement are obtained from worth
curves. Perturbation or eiqenvalue calculations may be used and differential
worths converted to a cubic or quartic polynomial. The reactivity calcu-
lation is different for fuel and sodium. For fuel, it is assumed that the
mixed fuel is spread uniformly through the channel as the interface moves
up (and down) increasinq the size of the interacting volume. Hence there
is loss of reactivity as some fuel moves to regions of lower worth. For
sodium, the column moves up and origional coolant is replaced by coolant
of reduced density. Consistant with perturbation theory, it is assumed that
the reactivity worth varies linearly with changes in density. Hence the
reactivity change associated with the fuel in one region is half, if only
half the fuel moves out of that region.
The SAS-VENUS modules depict the same series of events in a similiar
way with the following major exceptions. After the fuel-coolant interaction
takes place in a channel, only the positive void rate in SAs, was accounted
for. Also, when the fuel vapor pressures begin to build up, a switch from
SAS to VENUS is made. This switch is characterized by an increased ramp
rate (transitional ramp) and shut down is achieved via a Bethe-Tait type
analysis. Other differences are discussed in reference /1/.
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111 SNR-300 DATA
The SNR-300 LMFBR was analysed with the computational model outlined
above. The core was divided into 10 radial and 18 axial re~ions as was
done in the previous SNR-300 analysis /10/. Similiary, the siqnificant
neutronic data (neutron life time, doppler coefficient, delayed neutron
fractions, etc.), the doppler worths, fuel worths, sodium worths, initial
temperature distribution, power shape and fuel and sodium mass fractions
were obtained from reference /10/. One major difference is the thermo-
dynamic data used. The model employed in this study uses only averaqe
values of the various specific heats while the previous calculations use
tabulations to account for temperature dependence. The significant thermo-
dynamic data employed is given in the Appendix.
Another difference is that the axial molten zone for the thermal inter-
action in the SAS-VENUS calculation was 30 cm. Since the model used here
can only have failure in the center node, we obtain an interaction zone
of 20 cm (approximately). The fuel sodium interaction is equivalent since
the mass ratios of fuel and coolantstay the same. However, this makes the
present calculation conservative because less fuel is moved out as compared
to the SAS-VENUS runs. If we artificially increase the amount of fuel and
sodium, taking place in the interaction, the negative feedback is to
strong because it will come from the highest worth regions rather than be
spread out over a larger worth region.
One interesting feature of the SNR-30o fuel worth curves are that
the maximum values are below the axial midplane, while the temperature
reaks at the midplane or the axial node above the midplane. Since the
model only treatsthe case of midplane failure, there is an initial positive
contribution for fuel movement as the fuel particles move down the channel.
This effect is included in the results presented and occurs because of the
difference in the top and bottom reflectors.
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IV. SNR-30o ANALYSIS
For the nominal case, the reactivity ramp is taken as ~ 5/sec.,
the fuel particle size is 300/u diameter (150/u radius), 50% of the
radial pin cross section is molten and 100% of the molten fuel partici-
pates in the fuel coolant interaction. In addition the failure threshold
is taken to be 31410K. Since this is the only average temperature
calculated for the central node, the molten fuel participatinq in the
fuel-coolant interaction is also at 31410K. Ca ses at 30410K and 32410K
were also run and are discussed below.A drag coefficient Co = 0.44
was also chosen since it represents the theoretical lower limit and appears
valid in the sodium velocity range of interest. Higher values yield
a higher drage force which results in quicker movement of fuel. Hence
we have taken the most conservative approach here.
The transient proceeds as described in Section 11 and compares
with the SAS-VENUS result up to the initiation of failure. As shown
in Figure 1, the power reaches 40 times the nominal power in 350 milli-
seconds. The average temperature in the central axial node is 31410K
(100oK above the melting point) over a 20 cm axial length. This assurnes
that 50% of the areal cross section is molten.
At 352 milliseconds the pins fail in the first region followed by
those in the second at 355 milliseconds and those in the third at 360
milliseconds. Ourino this time period the power rises sharply due to
the increased ramp rate caused by sodium expulsion. At 360 milliseconds,
a larqe negative contribution comes into play caused by the fuel movement
and the trans;ent ;s terminated (defined when P/Po = 0.95) abruptly.
The reactivity components are shown in Fiqure 2. Note that the net
react;vity hovers below prompt critical until the sodium moves out and
superprompt criticality is maintained for only about 5 milliseconds.
Table I shows a comparison of this case with the failure thresholds
of 30410K and 32410K.
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Table I Sensitivity to failure threshold for Z 5/sec ramp,
lSo/u fuel particle and 50% of fuel pin (100% of
molten fuel) taking part in the thermal interaction.
failure threshold
+ thermal energy
release U~Wsec) 154 337 425
ave.temp. of malten
fuel (oK) 3065 3133 3152
amount of molten
fuel (kg) 524 1020 1248
+ In this and followinq tables, the enerqy released is that stored in
the molten fuel only and includes the heat of fusion.
Table I shows that when the fuel failure threshold is increased,
the energy yield, average temperature of the molten fuel and the amount
will increase. The increased threshold for failure delays the fuel
movement, permits more positive reactivity to be inserted, requires more
movement for shut down and therefore increas5the yield. The increased
malten fuel temperature also anhances ~he fuel-coolant interaction, driving
the fuel and sodium out quicker but since the problem is nonlinear, this
latter effect is not as important for the slow ramps of Z 5/sec.
In Table 11, the effect of particle size on the transient is shown.
Table 11. Effect of particle size on the nominal case with 50% of cross
section molten and 100% of the melt taking part in the thermal
interaction.
Threshold
50/U (r-ad ius ) 140 M~Jsec 337 M~Jsec 425 MWsec
30610K 31330K 31510K
480 kq 1020 kq 1248 kg
150/u(radius) 154 MWsec 337 M~Jsec 425 MWsec
30flSoK 31330K 31520K
524 kg 1020 kq 1248 kq
30o/u(radius) 287 M~Jsec 364 MWsec 358 MWsec
31170K 31390K 31350K
892 kg 1090 kq 1077 kg
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In general ~ increasing the particle size tends to increase the
enerqy in the molten fuel ~ the amount of molten fuel and its tempe-
rature. However~ there are two competing processes; the positive ramps
due to the insertion and the sodium~ and the negative ramp due to fuel.
Their time sequencing is sensitive to the particle size because of draq~
heat transfer and pressure generation. In the 32410K threshold case~
the failure and subsequent thermal interaction are held back in time so
that more fuel movement is needed to overcome the ~ 5 sec ramp insertion even
though the fuel moves Quicker for the 50/u radius fuel particle. For
the qeneral trend~ the fuel-coolant interaction and the motion due to
the draq force is smaller with increased particle size. This tends to
incerease the amount of total molten fuel and its enerqy and temperature.
There are three cases analysed with the SAS-VENUS code~ neqlecting
fuel feedback~ which can be used for comparison of the $ 5/sec ramp.
These are for the case of 150/u fuel particle radius and
a) 45% molten areal cross section molten/loo% of molten fuel participating
in the fuel coolant interaction,
b) 60% molten areal cross section molten/loo% of molten fuel participatinq
in the fuel coolant interaction,
c) 60% molten areal cross section molten/50% of molten fuel participatinq
in the fuel-coolant interaction.
Case a) gives the highest energy yield because the low failure
criterion (45% areal cross section molten) permits more channels to fail
which in turn produces a higher ramp rate (due to sodium voidinq) in the
transition to disassembly. Case b) produce a smaller yield~ even thouqh
the amount of fuel/pin takinq place in the thermal interaction is larger~
producinq faster sodium movement~ the total movement is less because hiqh
fuel vapor pressures are reached before the number of failures of
case a) is reached and the transition to disassembly takes place.
Case c) produces the weakest accident because both the amount of fuel/pin
and fuel/core takinq place in the thermal interaction is smaller.
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Table 111 shows a comparison of the worst case for the SAS-VENUS
modules (case (a) above), with the only difference beinq the size
of the interacting zone as discussed previously.
Table 111. Comparison of ~ 5/sec ramp with and without fuel feedback
for 150/u radius fuel particle, 45% of areal cross sect;on molten and
100% of molten fuel takinq part in thermal interaction.
w;thout feedback /1/ with feedback
3041 0K 31410K 03241 K
thermal energy 2080 589 667 896
released (Mt4sec)
averaqe tempo of 3756 3214 3247 3330molten fuel (oK)
amount of
molten fuel (kq) 2515 1569 1697 2043
The pessimistic nature of neqlectinq the feedback due to fuel
movement becomes obvious when examininq Tables 1-111 above. The 45%
threshold in SAS-VENUS correspond to an early pin fa;lure, with a lower
molten fuel temperature. Hence, the case of 30410K is probably the
closest for comparison purposes. The enerqy yield is reduced by a
factor of 4, the amount of molten fuel is nearly one half and the final
temperature of the melt is reduced 5000K when fuel movement is included.
The results are conservative because of the smaller axial molten zone
and because the SAS-VENUS results only 0;ve the eneroy qenerated dur;nn
the disassembly stage.
A compar;son of the cases a), b) and c) with equivalent cases ;ncludinq
fuel movement are shown in Table IV.
Table IV Comparison of accident spectrum for 150/u particle radius and ~ 5/sec ramp with and
without fuel movement. +
Fraction of total 0.250 0.450 0.600 case (a) case (b) case (c)fuel leaving pin
Threshold temgerature 3041 3141 3241 3041 3141 3241 3041 3141 3241 - - -
for fa i1 ure ( K)
Thermal Energy a11 pins fai 1 589 667 896 257 243 1050 2080 1980 1760
Re1eased (t~Wsec)
Amount of f"1o 1ten
whole core melts 1569 1697 2043 799 1051 2516 2515 1372 946Fuel (kc) without shut down
Ave.Temperature 3550 < T < TVAPOR 3214 3247 3330 3102 3123 3297 3751' 3200 3140of Molten Fuel (oK)
+
case (a) is equivalent to 0.450
case (b) is equivalent to o.roo
case (c) is equivalent to 0.250
I
.......
.......
I
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Table VII permits us to make the following comparisons. Case (a),as
we have seen,corresponds to the case of 0.45 fuel fractbn and the 3041 0K
failure threshold. For the SAS-VENUS case (b), the failure threshold is
delayed,hence there is more molten fuel per pin and it is hotter. This
would compare to the case of 0.60 fuel fraction and 31410K. In both cases
the accident gets weaker and in the same proportion. If we examine
case (c), where only 50% of the molten fuel mixes with coolant, we have a
hiqh threshold and its compar;son is the case of 0.250 fraction and threshold
temperature of 32410K. Here the model with fuel movement breaks down because
the fuel vaporizes before shutdown. The code should be stopped and the
switch to a VENUS type disassembly should be made. In such a case, the
transition ramp rate will be smaller and the result will compare favorably
with case (c).
One must be carefull when drawing conclusions because the calculations
are sensitive to the threshold used (either temperature or fraction of molten
fuel), particle size and the amount of fuel taking part in the fuel coolant
interaction.
An example of this sensitivity is the case of the 32410K failure threshold
with 60% and 50% areal fractions of molten fuel (Tables I and IV). Increasinq
the amount of fuel 20% yields a 100% increase in thermal energy released,
and doubles the amount of molten fuel. Examination of the reactivity
calculation shows that it' reaches prompt critical as in the other cases,
but now, since there is a little larger contribution of positive feedback
due to the asymmetrical fuel worth curves (as discussed in Section 111),
the net reactivity oscialltes about prompt critical (j3effective =
0.304 x 10-2) as each region fails. This effect is most sensitive at high
molten fuel temperatures where the thermal interaction is important. While
32410K is at the high end of the spectrum, it sill illustrates the point to
be made concerning sensitivity.
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Another example of this sensitivity can be seen by comparing the
cases for 150/u radius and fuel fractions 0.45, 0.50 and 0.60. As shown
in Tables I and IV, the case with 0.50 fuel fraction gives a milder
accident for all fuel failure thresholds. There are competinq processes;
fuel movement (both positive and neqative))heat transfer, sodium movement
and draq. The overall trend is to lower the enerqy as the fuel fraction
increases but there is a little oscillation in the curve at o.~o. This
was observed previously for the 1,000 MWe reactor analyzed by Mills and
Kastenberq /4/. This is shown qualitatively in Fiqure 4 of the next section.
It is clearly evident that what is pessimistic for one case is not
necessarily pessimistic for the other case. Hence one must be cautions
when using the word pessimistic in describing approximations for the
molten-fuel coolant interaction.
One other comparison that can be made is for the case of a $ 25/sec
ramp. Two cases were calculated with the SAS-VENUS models and are compared
w;th the model used here. The two SAS-VENUS runs corresponds to late and
early failure of pins.
Tabl~.Comparison for $ 25/sec ramp with 150/u radius fuel particle
and 100% of molten fuel leaving pin.
with fuel movement
30410K 31410K
without fuel movement /1/
late early
thermal
enerqy release 2180 2318 1800 544 594
(MWsec)
~~a ss of ~~o lten
Fuel (kq ) 3fi54 3428 3140 1240 1324
Äve.temperature
of molten fuel 3923 3768 3578 3090 3250
(OK)
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For this case, the model with fuel movement qives a larqer Yield
then without fuel movement. This can be explained as follows. The axial
model is for weak excursions. At ~ 25/sec, examination of the temperature
profile shows that much of the fuel is above 36910K in the nodes
surroundtng those that have failed before the fuel has begun to move up
the channel. Hence the model is no longer applicable. Either one has to
terminate the calculation earlier and proceede to a VENUS type analysis
(since high fuel vapor pressures already exist) or one must modify the
model to allow for fuel movement in other nodes. This will be explained
in the next section.
IV FURT HER OBSERVATIONS
A general observation of the analysis for SNR-300 using SAS-VENUS
is that the more total fuel participatinq in the molten fuel-coolant
thermal interaction, the higher the transitional ramp rate and hence
the thermal energy released. For the model trated here, the general trend
is the opposite. Figure 3 shows a qualitative plot of enerqy released
(at shut down) vs. fraction of total fuel participatina in the thermal
interaction. As the amount of fuel is reduced, both models should approach
an asymptotic value. One can askwhat this asymptotic value is. For the
model used in this work, letting the fraction of fuel participatinq in
the thermal interaction be reduced to zero, does not lead to a result
because the core continues to get hotter without any shutdown mechanism.
Physically, as this fuel fraction qoes to zero, the core would vaporize
in the center and shut down would occur due to vapor pressure. This enerqy
could be obtained by runninq the SAS-VENUS code with only the ~ 5/sec ramp
and zero increase in transitional ramp rate.
Other usefull limiting cases are for zero particle size (instantaneous
mixing with no time lag between fuel and sod;um movement) and for very larqe
part;cle s;ze (where there ;s no heat transfer to sod;um, no sod;um vo;d
effect and the fuel ;s swept out due to draq forces exerted by the coolant
flowing at a veloc;ty of 5 meters/sec). Fiqure 4 shows these asymptotic
results along with the values for 100, 300 and 600/u diameter part;cles,
and 50% fuel fract;on (50% molten, 100% of molten fuel part;ciratina in
the ;nteraction).
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For the case of the ~ 5/sec ramp, with 50% areal cross section
molten and 100% of the molten fuel participatinq in the thermal inter-
action, the limitinq cases yield an envelope for the thermal energy
generated between 100 MWsec and 600 MWsec. This is for all particle sizes
and all failure thresholds. For 60% areal cross section molten and 100%
of the molten fuel participatinq in the thermal interaction, all the points
fall in this envelope except the high case of 32410K threshold, as explained
previously. For the case of 45% areal cross section molten, the consistant
case of low temperature threshold, also falls within this envelope as well.
For the high temperature threshold the energy is just outside the envelope
(667 MWsec for 31410K threshold) and below the extreme for the Fo% case
(89E MWsec for the 32410K threshold).
The conversion to usefull work for the SAS-VENUS worst case, (case a)
yields approximately 200 MWsec or a 10% efficiency. With less molten fuel
and at a lower temperature this efficiency should be less for the results
reported here. Using the conservative approximation of 10% efficiency on
the nominal case; 150/ u particle radius, 50% fuel fraction and 3141
0K failure
threshold yields a usefull work of 34 MWsec. Using this 10% efficiency on
the accident envelope above yields a spread of 14 MWsec to Fo MWsec.
VI NEED FOR FUTURE WORK
The present model is simple in many respects. At present it can only
be used to show the importance of including fuel movement in unprotected
overpower transients. There are several areas which need improvement.
The present model only allows fuel failure in the center node with
instanteous mixing of fuel and coolant (but not heat transfer). A model
which permits fuel movement within the pin and throughout the whole molten
zone is required. In examining the results of the SNR-300 analysis, the
nodes surroundinq those that fail usually become molten durinq the transient,
and while they are counted in the total for molten fuel, they are not allowed
to escape the pin. Some of this fuel will be ejected as it melts and should
be accounted for. ~alter 16/, argues that for slow transients (50 tlsec),
failure of highly irradiated fuel will take place near the top of the core.
-16-
Hence molten fuel will be driven up the pin (while inside) by fission qas
pressure and then out into the coolant channel. Hence the picture of
fuel motion should be improved.
A second place where improvement is needed, is the fuel coolant thermal
interaction. Mixing and fraqmentation are assumed to occur instantaneously
as opposed to heat transfer. For this analysis the approach may not be
conservative since any delay will cause more fuel to become molten. However,
there is also a delay in the increased positive ramp rate due to sodium
ejection. Another feature is the calculation of the pressure generation as
sodium heats up. The pressure calculated in the model, often reaches several
thousand psi, much higher than observed in the TREAT tests /11/. One possible
reason may be the condensation of sodium on the cold fuel and channel walls
/11/. The simplified model used here needs improvement.
There are several programming limitations to the model used concerning
heat genration in the mixed fuel after the fuel-coolant interaction, the
doppler chilling, the average temperature used for both failure and fuel-
coolant mixinq and changinq the doppler constant in regions where sodium is
voided. These are felt to be second order effects when compared to the
analysis discussed previously and can be considered as programming difficulties
rather than physics difficulties.
VII CONCLUSIONS
The major conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are as
follows:
1) There is real incentive for correctly accountino for fuel movement
in the predisassembly phase of unprotected overpower transients. Preliminary
results show an order of magnitude reduction in thermal energy release and
the amount of malten fuel i5 smaller and cooler then when movement is
neqlected.
2) Assumptions which make the results of the SAS-VENUS conservative
do not in general make the results of this model conservative. In particular
pessimistic assumptions reqarding the molten fuel-sodium interaction te nd
to be reversed when including fuel movement.
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3) Further analysis is required to establish a new, more realistic
upper limit for the available work-energy on containment, vessel and
structure. The present value appears to be pessimistic.
4) The results of this analysis should not be used for desiqn
studies because of the inherent limitations of the model.
5) Experimental evidence of the fuel movement should be obtained
from inpile experiments with flowinq sodium to verify the models developed.
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APPENDIX
I. Physical and Thermodynamic Constants
FUEL SODIUr'1 UNITS
Specific heat of Solid 0.11 cal/qm-OK
Specific heat of 1i qu id 0.13 0.27 cal/om-oK
Heat of fusion 67 cal/qm.
Heat of vaporization 487 1130 cal/qm.
Meltinq temperature 3040 °K
Vaporization temperature 39Fl °K
Sonic velocity 6500 ft/sec
Critical Temperature 4910 °R
11. Equation of State Constants+
P = exp (a-b/T-c/T2 + dT - e 1n T) (1)
Temperature Range
a b c d e
below 20430R 17 .01062 23,073.3 0.0 0.00 0.05
2043 to 29610R 18.43200 22,982.0 0.0 0.0 0.63144
2961 to 49100R 1.77353 -12,610.96 3 .4112x10-7 1.122440x10-3 0.0
RT A
P =
V-D (V-B) (TV-C)
A = 2.15982 x 108 C = 255.6516
B = 3.15937 x 10-4 D = 1.746f1 x ,10-2
(2)
R = 1'7.24859
+
In Equation (1) the pressure has units of pounds per square inch,
temperature has units of deqrees Rankine.
In Equation (2) the pressure has units of pounds per square foot,
volume has the units of cubic feet per pound, and the temperature
is expressed in degrees Rankine.
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